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Where Did

the

Nez

Perces

by William L. Lang
On October 5, 1877, at the end of one of the trulyheroic
episodes in the Indian Wars in the Northwest, Chief Joseph
of the Nez Percessurrenderedto GeneralNelson A. Miles on
a snow-dustedbattlefield along Snake Creek near presentday Havre, Montana. The Indians gave up just forty-some
miles short of their destination-the international border
with Canada,wherethey hoped to find a sanctuary.They had
been pursued for nearly three months and over thirteen
hundredmiles fromtheir reservationin centralIdaho,testing
the military'sskill and their own stamina. In his surrender
message,Josephdescribedhis people'scondition as destitute
and his warriorsas tired of the struggle."Iwill fight no more
forever"-purportedly Joseph's words-became an anthem
and was symbolic of the Nez Perces'struggleand failure to

.

escape the military's inevitable maw.

A few moredaysof either better weatheror morestrength
might have changed the tragicoutcome of this nearlylegendary tale of heroics on the Montana plains. What had pre-

vented the Nez Perces from outdistancing their pursuers?
How had they been able to succeedforhundredsof miles and
months of deprivationonly to fall shortduringthe firstweeks
of autumn?
Partof the explanation is in YellowstoneNational Park.It
was in Yellowstone that the Nez Perces took their only rest
duringthe long march. Having consistently outmaneuvered
the military since their flight in central Idaho in July, the
eight hundredor moreNez Perceshad pushedthemselvesand
their nearlytwo thousandhead of stock as hardas they could.
But in Yellowstone, with the military several days behind
them, they pausedfor nearlytwo weeks, time enough to have
outracedthe harshautumnweatherand the military'spincer
to gain sanctuaryin Canada.
Why did the Indiansstay so long in the Park?And exactly
wheredid they go?These two questionshave puzzledjournalists and historiansever since the surrender,and the answers
that have been proposedhave never been satisfactory.Too
manycontradictionsremainunresolvedand too manyimportant issueshave been ignored by historians,whose inattention to details of the geography and ignorance of the
landformshave sent them literallyon the wrongtrails.Their
misreadingof the documentsand their mistakenassumptions
about Indian leadershiphave led them even furtherastray.
Most importantly, they have misunderstood the Indians'
purpose. The clues have been there all along, both in the

documentsandon thegroundin Yellowstone
NationalPark.z
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R

etracing the physicalrouteof the Nez

Perces and the documentarytrail left by
military,civilian,andIndiansourcesis part
detectivework and partprimeron the importance
of details in reconstructinghistoric events. The
sourcesaremeager:militaryreportsandofficialhistories; contemporarynews stories and articles;
popularaccounts;a few diaries,letters, and memoirs of participants;and Indianoral histories. But
the informationis there, if only the rightquestions
are asked.
The rightquestionsbeginwiththe historyof the
events during the summer of 1877. Because of
political,economic, and especially religious and
culturalconflicts,bandsof Nez Perces on theirreservationin centralIdaho(ledprincipallyby Joseph,
LookingGlass, and White Bird) chose to flee for
sanctuaryratherthanengagefrontiermilitaryforces
thathadbeen sent to chastisethem.Akey figurein
the conflict,ChiefJoseph, had unwillinglyled his
bandfromits homelandin northeasternOregonto
the reservationin Idaho just before the military
beganits disciplinaryaction.Headingeast fromthe
ClearwaterRiverinJuly,withGeneralO.O.Howard
and the 7th Infantryin pursuit, the Nez Perces
strategyto sucengaged in a flee-hide-and-retreat
cessfullyoutmaneuverthe often slow movingmilitary, followinga difficulttrail over Lolo Pass and
downinto Montana'sBitterrootValley.
In Montana,the Nez Perces made their second
majordecision,which committedthem to traversing some of the roughestterrainin NorthAmerica.
After the Indianshad skirted the barricadesthat
CaptainC. C. RawnfromFortMissoulahadthrown
up atthe bottomof LoloCanyon-afterwardknown
as "FortFizzle"-the chiefs argued about where
they shouldgo. Mostwantedto avoida fight,withat
least one leader warningthat it could only end in
complete destruction.White Bird and Red Owl
wantedto head norththroughthe FlatheadIndian
1. Withintwoyears,articleswerepublishedin nationalperiodicals
was
aboutthe Nez PerceflightandChiefJoseph.Thefirstbya participant
NationalParkof
TheWonders
of GeyserLand:A Tripto the Yellowstone
(BlackEarth,Wisconsin:Burnett&Son,1878),writtenbyFrank
Wyoming
atouristcapturedbytheNezPercesinYellowstone.
Carpenter's
Carpenter,
accountcreatedseveralmythsaboutthe Indians?motivesand actions.
Oneyearlater,Rt.Rev.W.H. Hareedited"ChiefJoseph'sOwnStory,"in
in
NorthAmericanReview(April1879),whichtoldthe storypurportedly
Joseph'sownwords. ThomasA. Sutherland,a journalistwho accompanied the militaryduringpartof the pursuit,wroteHoward'sCampaign
A. G.Walling,1878)andcontribAgainsttheNezPerceIndians(Portland:
utedsignificantlyto the imageof Josephas a militarygenius.AmiFrank
in the7thUnitedStatesCalvary(Corning,New
Mulford's
FightingIndians
York:PaulL. Mulford,1878)addedto Joseph'smilitaryreputation.By
1881,when O. O. HowardwroteNez PerceJoseph:An Accountof His
His Enemies,His Murders,His
Ancestors,His Lands,His Confederates,
War,HisPursuitand Capture(Boston:Lee andShepard,1881),Joseph's
field generalshipand sagacitywere alreadyestablishedin the popular
and
mind,althoughHowardbelievedJosephandhis bandto be "savages"
See O. O. Howard,letterto editor,(Portland)Oregonian,
"treacherous."
May3, 1879.Fora correctiveon Josephas a militarygenius, see Mark
H.Brown,"TheJosephMyth,"Montana,theMagazineofWestern
History
22 (Winter1972):2-17.

Reservationdirectly to Canada and safety. But
LookingGlass urged going south and east to the
Yellowstonecountry and the Crows because, as
LookingGlass reportedlyargued,"theCrowshad
promisedthemthatwheneverthe Nez Percesfought
the whites they wouldjoin them."3
This was one of severaltimes duringthe flight
when Nez Perce leadershotlydebatedwhattactics
to employ and which route to take. Whites have
consistently misinterpretedthe content and purpose of these councils.To observersfamiliarwith
militarydecision making,the Indians'discussions
have suggested confusion and disorganizationof
the worstkind,dominatedby indecisionand inefficiency. Although we do not know many of the
details,it is clearthatthe Nez Perce leaders chose
theirrouteastheywentby solvingproblemsthrough
council discussions. In this case, Looking Glass
evidentlyconvincedhis fellow chiefs that going to
Crowcountryby wayof the BitterrootandBig Hole
valleyswas the safest route.4
Theirdecisionto campin the Big Hole Valleyin
earlyAugust,however,turnedoutto be tragic.John
Gibbon'stroops from Fort Shaw and an undisciplined companyof volunteers surprisedthe Nez
Percesinapre-dawnraid.Thewhitesinflictedheavy
losses anddestroyedmostofthe Nez Perces'household goods. "Itwas a dreadfulsight,"MajorEdwin
Mason of the 7th Infantrywrote his wife afterthe
battle, "dead men, women and children. More
squaws were killed than men."5The Nez Perces
ralliedto fight off the raidersand then reeled from
the battlein angerandfacinga diresituation.Inpain
andsorrow,they carriedwiththemthe remnantsof
theirhouseholdsandracedheadlongeast fromthe
battlefield,tryingto shake Howardand Gibbon.By
2. The best historicalaccountsofthe Nez PerceflightareMerrillD.
and theNezPerceWar
ChiefJoseph
Beal, "IWillFightNo MoreForever,"
(Seattle:Universityof WashingtonPress, 1963);MarkH. Brown,The
Flightof theNez Perce(NewYork:Putnam,1967);FrancisHaines,Red
andHisPeople(Portland:
TheStoryofChiefJoseph
EaglesoftheNorthwest:
ScholasticPress, 1939);AlvinM.Josephy,Jr.,TheNezPerceIndiansand
YaleUniversity
the Openingof theNorthwest(New Haven,Connecticut:
Press, 1965).The best historiesfrom Indiansources are LucullusV.
McWhorter,HearMeMyChiefs!NezPerceHistoryandLegend(Caldwell,
Idaho:CaxtonPrinters,1942);McWhorter,YellowWolf:His OwnStory
(Caldwell,Idaho:CaxtonPrinters,1940);AllenP. Slickpoo,NonnNee-MePoo (We,theNezPerces)Cultureand Historyof theNezPerces(Lapwai,
Idaho:Nez PerceTribe,1973).
3. A confidantof the Nez Perces,furtraderDuncanMcDonald,got
this informationin conversationswith Nez Perces in Canadaafterthe
flightandreportedthemin a seriesof letterspublishedin NewNorthwest
(DeerLodge,Montana),January10,January17,February7,1879.Atthis
pointof decision,andlikelyothers,the Nez Perceshadalternativeplans.
Accordingto McDonald,WhiteBirdhadbeenpreparedto chargeRawn's
breastworks,torch the whole area,burn out ranchers,and race north
to Canada.
4. Accordingto McDonald,therewerediscussionsamongthechiefs
about going to Crowcountryand stayingthere over the spring and
January17, 1879.In
returningto Idahothe next spring.NewNorthwest,
FlightoftheNezPerce(202),MarkBrowndescribedthe Indians'decision
to flee to Montanaas likely the result of Indians"quarrelingamong
themselves"and"theirnaiveandsimpleanalysisof theirproblem."
5. EdwinMasonto Mrs.Mason,August13,1877,MasonLetters,MC
80, MontanaHistoricalSocietyArchives,Helena[MHSA].
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mid-Augustandafteranotherbattle,the Nez Perces
enteredYellowstoneNationalPark,exhaustedand
edgy about whites but relieved that the military
lagged a few days behindthem.
Once in the Park,the Nez Perces complicated
their flight and put themselves in additionaljeopardy. As they moved east up the Madison River,
theiradvanceguardencounteredandcapturedtwo
prospectorsand nine Montanatourists near the
LowerGeyserBasinalongthe FireholeRiver.Fearing thatany one of them might alertthe militaryto
their location,the Nez Perces decided to keep the
whites in their camp and undersurveillance.They
had little alternative,but their decision had significantconsequencesin the enfoldingdrama.Several
touristswouldescape fromthe campandgive valuableinformation
tothe militaryaboutthe Nez Perces'
route,allowingHowardandhis superiorsto planan
encirclementof the Indians.The Nez Perces' capture of the touristsalso increasedthe pressureon
Howardto catch the fleeing Indians.And in the
Indians'camp,the presence of the touristscreated
frictionbetween those who wantedto take vengeance on themforthe brutalityof the Big Holebattle
andthose who wantedto avoidany more conflict.6
Duringthe next thirteendays,fromAugust24 to
September5, the Nez Perces slowed their march,
while Howardcaught up and other militaryunits
movedin fromthe northandeast to interceptthem.
The Indianstraveledslowly,takinghours to string
into campand hours more to move back on to the
trail.Eachfamilyand largerbandtrailedtheir own
horses, carried their own household goods, and
camped together. The white prisoners, traveling
behindthe women'spacktrain,wereunderthe controlof LeanElk,a mixed-bloodwho spoke English.
In reconstructingthe events.fromthis pointin the
story,three things shouldbe kept in mind:the Nez
Percestraveledin separatebandswithno individual
in overall command;they were unsure of which
route they wantedto take;and, althoughthey had
some knowledge of the military'spositions, they
had no idea of its strategy.

ChiefJoseph, shown here in about 1877, was
mistakenlytaken to be the warriorchief who
guidedthe Nez Perces on their 1,200-miletrek.
Nez Perces had captured in the Park. Shively had
been held by the Indians for eleven days before he
managed to escape in early September and hike
through the wilderness to the nearest Montana
settlements, where he began telling his incredible

story. Shivelygave the New Northwesteditor a de-

he standard versionof whatthe Nez
Perces did in Yellowstoneoriginatedin an
articlepublishedinJamesMills'sNewNorthwestin mid-September1877,whilethe Indianswere
stilleludingthe military'sgraspin centralMontana.
Its source,John Shively,was one of the people the
6. For descriptionsof the conflictamongthe Nez Perce,see Mrs.
of PioneerLife,"Contributions
to the
GeorgeF. Cowan,"Reminiscences
HistoricalSocietyofMontana,10vols. (Boston:J. S. Canner,1966),4:156187; Carpenter,Wonders
58-62;McWhorter,YellowWolf,
of Geyserland,
Adventuresin
170-173;HeisterDean Guieand LucullusV. McWhorter,
(Caldwell,Idaho:CaxtonPress, 1935),111-122.
Geyserland

tailed account of the Nez Perces, complete with
descriptions of camp life, speed of travel, and presumed conflicts among Indian leaders. As compelling today as it must have been in 1877, Shively's
story emphasized danger and his backwoods savvy
in making a thrilling dash for freedom. His descrip7. NewNorthwest,
September14,1877.ForJamesMills'schanging
attitudestowardthe Nez Perces,see Brown,Flightof theNezPerce,216217,248,andRexC. Myers,"TheSettlersandthe Nez Perce,"Montana,
theMagazineof Western
History27 (Autumn1977):20-29.
8. NewNorthwest,
September14,1877.Millswasequallycriticalof
the military.Writingin an editorialin this same issue, he chargedthat
Howardwas off"geysergazing,"ratherthanpursuingthe Nez Percesin
Yellowstoneand furtherthat the whole campaignwas the productof
corruptIndianagentsandthe infamous"IndianRing."

18

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.75 on Fri, 7 Dec 2012 11:48:26 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

I!l:W$
WilliamHenryJacksontookthis photographof
LookingGlasswhenthe Nez Percechiefwas on
an earliertripto CrowCountryin 1871.

tion of the Indians'behaviorin Yellowstone,however, is the most importantpart of his testimony.
Shivelyclaimedthat the Indianshad become lost
andhad wanderedaimlesslyfor severaldays.This
versionof events has been repeatedin one formor
anotherby historiansever since.7
Shivelyportrayedthe Nez Perces as disorganized and confused.At one point, he reported,the
leaders had become so disorientedthat they had
mistakenone side of a majormountaindivideforthe
other,a significanterrorthatconvincedShivelythat
the Indianswere lost. As Shively told Mills, the
Indianshadoriginallytakenhim alongas a guide to
to theHistoricalSocietyof
of S. G. Fisher,"Contributions
9. "Journal
Montana,10vols.(Boston:J.S. Canner,1966),2:269-282.Fisher'soriginal
articlewas taken,is in the Idaho
journal,fromwhichthe Contributions
HistoricalSocietyArchives,Boise.The originaljournaldiffersin several
respectsfrom the publishedversion,which omits crucialdetails and
introducesphrasesandtermsnotpresentin the original.I amindebtedto
CherylWilfongforfirstpointingout these discrepanciesto me.

lead them through the AbsarokaMountains-the
east boundaryof the Park. But once the Indians
were east of the Yellowstone River and heading
towardthe Shoshone Riverand the route to Crow
country,a "Snakechief' had claimedhe knew the
wayandShivelywas retiredas guide. Butinsteadof
turningsoutheastandheadingtowardthe Shoshone,
the Nez Perces had ended up on the headwatersof
the LamarRiver(theEastForkof the Yellowstone).
Shivelyclaimedthat he had knownthey were lost
buthad saidnothinguntilaftera "councilof chiefs,"
when the Nez Perces asked him: "Whichway to
Crowcountry?"Shivelyhad shownthem "theopen
countryabout20 miles off towardthe CrowCountry,"evidentlyfroma high pointof landnearthe Nez
Perces' camp. He had escaped from his captors
duringthatnight,leavingthe Indiansto pursuethe
route he had shown them.8
The only other detailedaccountwe have of the
Indians'movementsinYellowstonecomes fromthe
journalof S. G. Fisher, chief of Howard'sscouts.
Stayingas close to the retreatingIndiansas they
could,Fisherandsome fortyBannockIndianscouts
followedthe Nez Perces east fromthe Yellowstone
Riverto the headwatersof the Lamar,sendingback
reports to Howard.The only description of the
Indians'route throughthe AbsarokaMountainsis
in Fisher'swords.9
Using Fisher'spublishedjournal,the reportsof
militarycommands,Shively'saccount,andinformation from a few Indianinformants,historianshave
proposedseveraldifferentroutesthatthe Nez Perces
mighthavetakenthroughthe mountains.All of the
creeks that drainwest fromthe Absarokasintothe
Lamar River-Soda Butte, Calfee, Cache, and
Miller-have been identified as the Nez Perces'
route,but the most recenthistorieshave settled on
either Cache Creek or Miller Creek as the most
likely.10A fresh examinationof the sources and
Yellowstone'stopography,however,suggests that
the mainbodyof the Nez Percesfollowedthe upper
Lamar,that the Indiansdid not travelin one large
group,andthatthey were never lost in the Park.
10. E. S. Topping,Chroniclesof the Yellowstone
(St Paul:Pioneer
Press,1883),219-220,describesthe NezPerce"goingupCacheCreek"to
cross the mountains.In 1895,in The Yellowstone
NationalPark (1895;
reprint,Norman:Universityof OklamonaPress, 1964), HiramMartin
Chittendendescribedthe Nez Percerouteas "thenorth-eastboundaryof
the Park"(105);butin a subsequentedition(Cincinnati:
Stewart& Kidd,
1917),Chittendenwrotethatthe Nez Perce"leftthe Parkbywayof Miller
Creek"(126). MerrillD. Beal, in 7 WillFightNo MoreForever,"209,
describedthe NezPercerouteas upCacheCreek.Brown,FlightoftheNez
Perce,338, believedthat the Nez Perce "turnedsouth-eastward
up the
dividebetween Cache and Calfeecreeks."In The Nez PerceIndians,
Josephyputthe Nez Perceon CacheCreek,as didAubreyHainesin The
Yellowstone
Story,2 vols. (Boulder:ColoradoAssociatedUniversityPress,
A Wilderness
1977),1:236,and RichardA. Bartlett,Yellowstone:
Beseiged
(Tucson:UniversityofArizonaPress,1985),27. In "Loston ColdCreek,"
33
Daniel
Montana,theMagazineof Western
(Autumn
1973):
2-19,
History
Goodenoughdidwhatotherhistorianshadfailedto do:he scoutedoutthe
trail,withdocumentsandmapsin hand.Heconcludedthatthe Nez Perce
wentup MillerCreek.
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he explanations for the Nez Perces'

routeandthe timethey spentinYellowstone
begin with the landscape.Travelingeast of
where the Yellowstone River emerges from the
southernextremitiesof YellowstoneLake,the Nez
Perces ascended the meanderingPelican Creek
through a lush valley of knee-deep grass, where
their large herd of stock could feast. From this
verdanthaven, there were only a few routes that
would take the Indiansto buffalocountryon the
lower Yellowstone.There were not many passes
through the Absarokas and few easy pathways
throughthe dense lodgepole forest that carpeted
the terrainbelow8,000feet in elevation.Headingtowardthe Absarokarange from PelicanCreek,the
Indianshad to make their trail over a low divide.
Then they could either turn south and cross a
higher divide to the Shoshone Riverdrainageor
continueeast to the headwatersof the LamarRiver
at the base of the imposingAbsarokas.The easiest
path to the lower Yellowstone was down the
ShoshoneRiver;the next easiest routes,especially
forsuch a largegroup,were eitherdownthe Lamar
Riverand the lower canyonsof the Yellowstoneto
broadervalleyterrainnearpresent-dayLivingston,
Montana,oreastupSodaButteCreekandthe upper
sectionofthe Clark'sForkoftheYellowstone,which
cut throughthe eastern section of the Absarokas.
The most difficultroutes pierced the 11,000-foothigh Absarokamountainchain-the narrowslots
createdby Miller,Cache,andCalfeecreeks andthe
upperLamarRiver.
After capturingJohn Shively and the Montana
tourists near the Firehole Riveron August 23-24,
the Nez Perces movedeast towardthe Yellowstone
River on a route that took them south of Mary
Mountain.Along the trail,there was a commotion
when severalwarriorsthreatenedthe touristsand
shot George Cowanat point-blankrange, leaving
him for dead.Duringthe fracas,five of the tourists
escaped,takingtheir storyand a descriptionof the
Nez Perces'locationto Howard'stroopsat Henry's
Lake.The threeremainingtourists-Emma Cowan
and Ida and FrankCarpenter-along with Shively
and James C. Irwin,a recentlydischargedsoldier
the Indianshadalsocaptured,werepulledbackinto
the Indians'procession. The Nez Perces trailed
eastwardalong the southernfringe of the Hayden
Valleyto a fordacrossthe YellowstoneRiverabout
four miles below YellowstoneLake.They camped
on the east bankof the river,discussed whatto do
withthe captives,anddecidedto releaseMrs.Cowan
andthe Carpenterson August25.The Indiansgave
the women horses but put FrankCarpenterafoot,
4:17211. Cowan,"Reminiscencesof PioneerLife,"Contributions,
AdofGeyserLand,5862;GuieandMcWhorter,
176;Carpenter,Wonders
venturesin GeyserLand,201-231;McWhorter,YellowWolf,170-176.

thereby slowing the tourists'travel to the settlements. TakingShivelyand Irwinalong with them,
the Indianscontinuedeast towardthe Absarokas.11
The next day,while S. G. Fisher and his scouts
were inspecting the site where Cowanhad been
shot,the Indiansmovedtheircampnorthto Yellowstone Lakenear present-dayIndianPond. On August 28, Fisherquickenedhis pursuit,followingthe
Nez Perces' trail and crossing the Yellowstone,
wherethey "passedone of the enemy'scamps"and
very nearlycaughtthe Indiansin campby the lake.
More interested in booty than conflict, Fisher's
BannockIndianscoutsscatteredwhenthey sawtwo
Nez Perce warriors.As Fisherjottedin his journal:
"I told them [Bannocks]what I thought of their
bravery."Switchingto a fresh horse, Fisher pursued the Indiansalone, going "upPelican Creek
about10miles,leftit andwentontoMt.,saw smoke
from enemys camp."He got a good fix on the
Indians'positionand made his way down Pelican
Creek,arrivingin campon the Yellowstone"about
midnight."12

Fisherspentthe next two days in camp,arguing
with his scouts and recoveringfroma stomachailment.Howard'sscouts broughtFishera new horse
andwordthatGeorgeCowanhadbeen foundalive.
Emma Cowanand the Carpentershad also made
theirwaysafelyto Mammoth,afterbeing pickedup
west of Mt. Washburnon August 27 by soldiers
from Fort Ellis who had been sent on a scouting
partyinto the Park.Afterdismissingtwenty-twoof
his Bannockscouts,FisherselectedafewBannocks
andsome good frontiersmenin his camp,prepared
his gear, and startedoff on the morningof August
31 to trackthe Nez Percesthroughthe dense lodgepole forestbelow the Absarokas.13

WV

hile

Fisher had been weedinghis

the Nez Perces had moved their
A/force,
v camps over the Pelicandivide.By August
31,theywereon the headwatersofthe LamarRiver,
at the base of the Absarokas.Probablythe largest
groupto everpenetratetheYellowstonewilderness,
the Indians moved slowly, caravaningin several
largebands.The groupspreadout overa milewide
when they crossed the PelicanValley'slush meadows, then narroweddown to practicallysingle-file
columns when they ascended and descended the
canyons.Theyleftanunmistakabletrail,one Fisher
had little difficultyfollowing. Howard's aide-de12. Journalof S. G. Fisher,typescript,p. 5, IdahoStateHistorical
SocietyArchives,Boise [FisherJournal].See alsoFisherJournal,Contributions,2:273.
13. FisherJournal,pp. 6-7;FisherJournal,Contributions,
273-274;
of PioneerLife,"184-187.
Mrs.GeorgeCowan,"Reminiscences
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The Nez Perces in Yellowstone,1877
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camp, Charles E. S. Wood described the Nez
Perce "horde":
with their vast band of horses, [they] swept their
pathclean of subsistence,forage,and supplies,so
that where they had abundanceour ration was
scanty... Wheretheiranimalsgrazedoursstarved;
where they had a horde of 2,000 fresh horses to
replacetheir exhaustedstock, we found only the
useless ones they had abandoned.14

HowmuchJoseph,LookingGlass,andotherNez
Perce leaders knew about the army'smovements
and how they respondedto the informationfrom
theirownscoutsis notclear,butit is certainthatthe
Indiansknew of Howard'sposition,the locationof
ranchesalongthe YellowstoneRiver,the existence
of tourist parties in the Park, and the advanceof
additionaltroops from Fort Ellis. Once over the
Pelican Creek divide on August 28-with Fisher
trailingthem-the Nez Perces sent scouts to find
the best route throughthe mountains.It is likely
that one of these scouting parties brought back
informationthat turned the Indians away from
crossing over to the Shoshone River.According
to HughL. Scott,a young officerwho accompanied
LieutenantGustavusDoane'scommandfrom Fort
Ellis,ChiefJosephtoldhimrepeatedlyin lateryears
that the Nez Perces had intendedto go down the
Yellowstone,"leavingthe mountainswherethe river
turnsnortheast-now the site of the townof Livingston."The Indiansdecided against the route, Joseph told Scott, when Nez Perce scouts encountered Doane's small force coming up the Yellowstone on August 31.15

wantedno partof the Nez Perces'trouble.The Nez
Perces then set their route down the Lamarand
Yellowstonerivers, as Joseph told Scott, because
"theydidnotwish to encounteranymoretroopson
their front,with the risk of being caught between
twoforces."Ironically,ifthe Indianshadgone down
the Yellowstonethey wouldhaverunheadlonginto
Colonel S. D. Sturgis's360-manforce, which was
thenatCrowAgencyon the StillwaterRiverreadyto
catchthe Nez Perces in a pincer.16
In Shively's account, after the Indianshad removedhimas guide,they had"merelygone around
a mountainand came down on the same tributary
waters instead of crossing the divide [to the
ShoshoneRiver]."As Shivelysawit,the Indianshad
become confusedby the landscapeandhad gotten
"lost."7To questionsput to them manyyears later
by historianLucullusMcWhorter,Nez Perceveterans of the trek throughYellowstonehad other answers.
McWhorter:Was Joseph lost in YellowstoneNationalPark?
Nez Perce:ChiefJoseph never lost there, maybe
anothermanlost there.
McWhorter:Was Joseph lost in YellowstoneNationalPark?
Nez Perce:I am (surely)nowayto get lost,because
PaulJacksonfatherwas leadingthe entireprocession at thatday.He namewas Ho-to-toe-e,it
means somethinglike mix withtobacco ... he
was familiarwiththe countryeast of the Rocky
Mountains... he alwayslivethere,raisedthere,
and the Indiansdependon him at thatday.18

This explanationraises questions. If the Nez
Perces intendedto descend the Yellowstone,why
didtheycrossthe riverinthe firstplace?Whynotgo
downthe riveron the west bank?Whenthe Indians
enteredthe Park,they came up the MadisonRiver
to the Firehole,not north to IndianCreek on the
BannockTrail,a traditionalIndianrouteacrossthe
YellowstonePlateau.Whenthey enlistedShivelyas
a guideonAugust24,the Nez Perceswantedto take
the mostdirectrouteto Crowcountry-east through
Yellowstoneand down the Shoshone. Once they
hadcrossed the Yellowstoneon August25, the Nez
Perces sent representativesto enlist the aid of the
Crows,butthey returnedwithbadnews:the Crows

The Indianswere not lost in Yellowstone,but
theywerein a quandaryaboutwhichroutewouldbe
the safest. Their only informationcame from the
severalscouting-raiding
partiestheyhadsent outas
they movedeast acrossthe Park.OnAugust26, one
of these parties charged a group of tourists from
HelenaintheircampatOtterCreek,notfarfromthe
falls of the Yellowstone.The raidersfired on the
campers,chased them on horseback,looted their
camp,andleftone touristdeadbeforethey returned
to the Nez Perces'maincampatIndianPond.Three
days later, another raiding party descended the
Yellowstonebelowpresent-dayGardinerandlooted
and burnedthe ranch of the Hendersonbrothers.
Scott'smen chased the Indiansback up the river,

14. CharlesE. S. Wood,GeneralFieldOrdersNo. 6, Reportof the
Secretaryof War,45thCong.,2ndsess., H. Ex. Doc. 1 (Serial1794),619.
15. HughLenoxScott,SomeMemoriesof a Soldier(NewYork:The
CenturyCompany,1928),64-65.Scottwrote:"Iwas firsttold of this by
wasconfirmedby a signedstatement
Josephin 1877,andhis information
obtainedby the Nez Perceagentat Nespelem,Washington."
forShivelyand
whohadresponsibility
16. LeanElk,the mixed-blood
Irwin,toldthem afterthey hadcrossedthe Yellowstonethatscoutshad
been sent to get aidfromthe Crows.Shively'saccount,NewNorthwest,
September14,1877;Scott,Memoriesofa Soldier,65;ThomasB. Marquis,
Memoirsof a WhiteCrowIndian(NewYork:CenturyCompany,1928),
128-130.

17. New Northwest,September14, 1877.There is some question
whetherShivelywas actuallythe Indians'principalguide.Respondingto
J. W. ReddingtonsuggestedthatIrwin
queriesby LucullusMcWhorter,
guidedthe IndiansandthatShivelywas actually"bossof the packtrain."
J. W. Reddingtonto LucullusMcWhorter,January20, March10, 1931,
Folder175,#13,andFolder158,#93,LucullusMcWhorter
Papers,WashingtonStateUniversityArchives,Pullman[McWhorterPapers].Yellow
thatShivelyguidedthe Indiansforonlypartof
WolfalsotoldMcWhorter
one day, when they were west of the YellowstoneRiver.McWhorter,
YellowWolf,170.
Folder158,Misc.notes#14
18. LucullusMcWhorter'sinterrogations,
and#15, McWhorterPapers.
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Placesand Events
1. Fisher'sscout camp
2. FisherdiscoveredNez Perce camp
3. Fishermet up with Irwin
4. Roughcanyonwhere Nez Perces pushed horses through
dense forest
5. WhereReddingtoncaughtup with Fisher
6. FisherwatchedIndiansmove into the "trap"
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where they fired on three courierswho had been
sent by ColonelSturgis.It is likely that this is the
raidingpartythat alertedJoseph that the military
blockedthe Indians'routedownthe Yellowstone.19
Anothergroup of scouts includedYellowWolf,
who latertold McWhorter:"Itwas a few suns after
the chiefsturnedthe whitemanandwomen [Emma
Cowanand the Carpenters]loose that what I am
telling you happened."At McCartney'sHotel in
Mammoth,YellowWolfs raiderssurprisedRichard
Dietrich,one of the Helenacampers,and shot him
down.The Indianwho pulledthe triggershouted:
"Weare going to kill him now. I am a man!I am
going to shoot him!"Afterthe killing,YellowWolf
and his friends skirmished with other whites,
roundedup some horses, and headed back to the
Nez Perces'campon the LamarRiver.20

stone,wherethe BannockTrailintersectsthe river,
is near present-dayTower Fall.23Manyof the Nez
Perces knewthe Bannockroute,andif anyof them
had been with the young YellowWolfthat day it is
likely that they would have forded the river and
followedthe trailacrossSpecimenRidgeanddown
to the Lamar.
WhenYellowWolfs group-and likelythe group
that had burnedHenderson'sranch-returned to
camp, they told Joseph that more whites and the
armywere thick downthe Yellowstone.This informationmust have put Joseph, LookingGlass, and
otherchiefsin a quandary.They hadrejectedgoing
to the Shoshone River,theirprimeroute downthe
Yellowstonewas blocked,andthey wantedto avoid
the white settlement at the Clark'sFork mines,
which lay to the northeastup Soda Butte Creek.
Shivelydescribedthe scene:"Herescoutsweresent
out, the Snake chief going to Baronette'sbridge,
n some accounts, the raiderswho burned whichhe burned.Thenthey knewtheywerelost."24
the Hendersonranchare linkedto the Dietrich Knowingthat soldierswere on their trailand movkilling and also to the burning of Baronett's ing at themfromat least two directions,Josephand
bridgeontheYellowstone.Historianshaveassumed the otherchiefs had only one option:traveldirectly
thatallof these raidingpartiescamefromthe same throughthe Absarokas,up one of the streamsruncamp,were underthe controlof one or two chiefs, ningwestfromthe divide.Butwhichone wassafest?
and had first crossed Baronett'sbridge from the
There are few clues about exactly where the
east beforeburningit when they re-crossedit from Nez Perces were on the LamarRiverwhen they
the west. In YellowWolf's case, his scouting was
realizedtheir predicament.Shivelytold Mills that
due as muchto his ownsense of purposeas to direc- the Indianswere about fifteen miles southeastof
tives from warriorchiefs. As he told McWhorter, the Clark'sForkmines, but thatcannotbe correct;
therewere severalscoutingpartiesand"eachparty the easternmostextremitiesof the Lamardrainage
did scoutingevery sun."Whetherthe raidersused
aresouthandwestof the mines. Shively'sestimates
Baronett'sbridge is also questionable.Under re- of distancewere also inaccurate.Fisher,Irwin,and
peated questioningby historianMcWhorter,Yel- J. W. Reddington, an experienced scout who
low Wolfinsistedthathe knew of no bridgeacross trackedthe Indianswith Fisher for several days,
the Yellowstone.21
were trainedobserverswho drewmapsof the area,
fixed locations,and accuratelyestimatedmileage.
McWhorter:
Whatwaydidwarriorsgo tothebridge
Their accountsprovidethe most reliableinformathatwas partlyburned?
tion aboutthe locationof the Nez Perces'campon
YellowWolf:Therewasno bridgethatI knowofbut
the LamarRiver.
some ofthe Indiansburnedupsomebedingand
Fisher began his pursuitof the Indianson Sepgrube.
McWhorter:
WestoreastsideofYellowstoneRiver?
tember 1 from his camp below YellowstoneLake.
YellowWolf:WewentoverintoYellowstoneRiver.22
Followingthe Nez Perces' trail up Pelican Creek,
IfYellowWolfdidnot use Baronett'sbridgeand Fisherreportedin his journal,he "meta white man
had not heard of it, then how did he get from suddenly.I instantlycoveredhim with my gun and
MammothHot Springs to the LamarRiver?And orderedhim to advance... believeingat the time
does his route tell us anythingaboutthe Indians' that he belonged to the Enemy.... he evaded an
answerasking who I was."The two men swapped
strategy?Yellow Wolfs answer to McWhorter's
21. McWhorter,YellowWolf,175-177.GeneralHoward,in "Supplequestiongives us a clue: He said he went into the
Nez PerceCampaign"
(December26,1877),
mentaryReport.Non-Treaty
river.The traditionalcrossing pointon the Yellow- ReportoftheSecretaryofWar,1877,621,reportedthathis scoutsbrought
19. Brown,Flightof the Nez Perce,329-334;Col.John Gibbonto
AssistantAdj.Gen.Dept of Dakota,October18, 1877,in Reportof the
Secretaryof War,1877,522;Scott,Memoriesofa Soldier,61-63;Shively's
account,NewNorthwest,
September14, 1877;MaryAllenPhinney,Jirah
IshamAllen (Rutland,Vermont:TuttlePublishingCompany,n.d.), 96;
OrrinH. and LorraineBonney,Battle Drums and Geysers(Chicago:
SwallowPress, 1970),77-80.
20. McWhorter,YellowWolf,172,177.

himinformation
thatonegroupof raiders,"probably
notmorethanten in
hadburneda store,killeda citizen,foughtwithDoane'stroops,
number,"
and then recrossedthe Yellowstoneand burnedBaronett'sbridge.To
questionsaboutthe couriersfiredon by raidersnearTowerFall,Yellow
Wolfresponded:"Idon'tknowanythingaboutthis question... I never
heardof it."Brown,FlightoftheNezPerce,331-333,repeatedthe storiesof
separateraidingpartieswithoutdistinguishingbetweenthe groups.
22. McWhorterinterrogations,Folder 158, #124, McWhorter
Papers.
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Baronett's bridge, which the Nez Perces burned during their flight in 1871, was built by Jack Baronett
who would become one of the first assistant superintendents of Yellowstone National Park. The toll
bridge was built to provide access to newly discovered mines at the Clark's Fork of the Yellowstone.

questionswarilyfor a few minutes before Fisher
acceptedhis claimthat"hewas an escapedprisoner
fromJosephs band."It was Irwin,the soldier who
hadbeen capturedby the Indiansa week earlieron
the FireholeRiver.He had escaped with Shively's
help and had backtrackedon the Indians'trail.
FisherpumpedIrwinfor informationandthen sent
himbackto Howard'sheadquartersbeforecontinuing into the wildernesson the Indians'track.25
"Wemadeaboutsix miles... we are now on the
waterofEastForkofYellowstone... liveingon meat
streight,"Fisher wrote on September2, two days
afterJosephandLookingGlasshad discussedtheir
optionsin a council meeting.The next day Fisher
pressed on into the dense lodgepole pine forest,
wherethe Nez Perces hadtakenan incredibletrail,
pushing their livestock hard and funnelingdown
23. AubreyL Haines,"The BannockIndianTrailsof Yellowstone
in Montana4 (March1962):1-8;Haines,
NationalPark,"Archaeology
Yellowstone
Story,2:27-28;BrighamD. Madsen,TheBannockof Idaho
(Caldwell,Idaho:CaxtonPress, 1958),20, 23,180.
24. NewNorthwest,
September14, 1877.In his reporton the events
inYellowstone,ColonelGibbonwrotethatthe Nez Percestraveleddown
theeastbankof theYellowstone"asfaras Baronette'sbridge,whichthey
burnt,.. ."Reportof the Secretaryof War,1877,522.
25. FisherJournal,p. 7; FisherJournal,Contributions,
274; New
Northwest,
September14, 1877;IdahoStatesman,September20, 1877.

the few open passages in the timber.Fisher could
not believethe trailandthe Indians'determination:
September, Monday 3, 1877. Off on trail at
daylightpassed down the roughist canyon I was
everthroughdeadandfallentimbrandrocksfound
plenty of dead crippledhorses left by the enemy
they evidentlyhad a hardstruggleto get through
this placefor the trees andlogs was smearedwith
bloodfromtheirhorses cut on the sharpstones &
pine knots....

At this point,Fisher and his few remainingscouts
came up quicklyupon the Nez Perces' camp.'We
sawthe Enemy'scampabout7 or 8 milesto the East
ofus on ornearthe Sumitofa high Mt,"Fisherwrote
on September3, just as J. W. Reddington"brought
us some Bacon&beansandletterfromCommand."
Reddingtonfound Fisher campedin a meadowon
lower Mist Creek,not farfromthe LamarRiver.26
26. FisherJournal,p. 8. The publishedversionof Fisher'sJournalin
Contributions
does not includethese passages,whichpinpoint Fisher's
locationinthelowermeadowsofMistCreek.Workingfromthe published
version,DanielGoodenoughassumedthatFisherwason ColdCreek,but
in his uneditedjournalFisherwrote:"Wewere severalhours makeing
downto the Maincreek,one of the branchesof EastFork."This mustbe
MistCreek,not ColdCreek,whichFisherwouldnot havedescribedas
"theMaincreek."
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The mouthof the upperLamarRiveris wide and inviting,with plentyof roomon each side of the
riverto drivehorses. Fartherup the river,the canyonnarrowsbut the riverbottomremainswide
and relativelyclearof timber.

isher and Reddington
climbedto the top

of a ridge at dawn. As Reddingtonrememberedit,"welookedrightacrossa deepcanyon
andintohostilecamp,andit struckus thattheywere
putting up log breastworksto make a stand and
give battle."The two men saw activityin the Nez
Perces' camp,but it is more likely that the Indians
were preparingto leave ratherthandiggingin for a
fight. The night before, Shivelyhad escaped after
he had showedthe Indiansa routeto Crowcountry.
It is clear that the Nez Perces were worriedabout
how much the militaryknew about their location.
LeanElk had warnedShivelyafterIrwin'sescape:
"I no care [aboutIrwin]but if you try to go I get
heapmad."The Indiansknewthatthey hadto move
27. J. W. Reddingtonto LucullusV. McWhorter,November1931,
Folder 175, #167, McWhorterPapers;J. W. Reddington,"Scoutingin
Montanain the 1870s,"typescript,JohnW. ReddingtonPapers,SC683,
MHSA;
September14, 1877.ReddingShively'sAccount,NewNorthwest,
tonwroteseveralarticlesabouthis yearsas a scoutforSunsetMagazine,
andotherpublications.
Hewasconsistentin his tellingof
PacificMonthly,
the Nez Perce story. See manuscriptarticlesin John W. Reddington
Papers,Universityof WashingtonArchives,Seattle.
28. FisherJournal,p. 8; FisherJournal,Contributions,
275.

quickly if they expected to elude the military.
Their respite in Yellowstone National Park was
aboutover.27
Fisher sketched a mapof the Indians'campand
wroteto Howard,advisinghim to strikeout for the
Clark'sFork"bysome otherroute"to interceptthe
Nez Perces, because he thoughtit "nextto impossible for him [Howard]to movehis Commandover
this trail."Sending Reddingtonback to Howard's
command,Fisherleftcampearlyon September4 to
keep watch on the Indians.Afterworkinghis way
throughthe thick timber,Fisher
sawthemgathertheirhorses andpulldownlodges
about noon .... They are followingup Canyon
29. This descriptionis basedon personalobservationsin the Lamar
Riverarea in 1983.The Yellowstoneforest goes througha full cycle
approximately
every100years,so whatwe see inthemid-1980sis probably
the kind of conditionsthe Nez Perces saw. DanielGoodenough,in his
1973article,assumedthatthe "trap"
wasMillerCreek,eventhough,as he
He calls it a "trap,"
noted,"MillerCreekis not,in facta complete'trap'."
because"apartymovingon horseswouldhaveno sensibleroutethrough
themountainsexcepttofollowthe streamupandoverBootjackGap."This
is faultyreasoning,assumingbeforehandthat BootJackGapwas their
destination,anareathatprovidedno reasonablecampingareaorplacefor
2,000headof livestock.Goodenough,"Loston ColdCreek,"26.
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nearlyEast.Theyarenowinwhatthe Bannockscall
the trap; they tell me that there is no way of
gettingout of it except at each end being about15
milesthroughit.Afterdoggingthemalongabout3
miles at 2 p.m. we heard rapidfireingimediately
below us in the Canyonabout100 shots fired.We
left our horses and starteddowntowardsthe fireing but find a perpendicularwall between us and
the row... 28

Reddingtonleft for Howard'scommandon the
morningof September3, beforeFishersawthe Nez
perces packuptheircampandbeforehe continued
down the LamarRivertowardSoda Butte Creek.
WhenShivelywentto LeanElk'slodge on the night
of September2-"with his boots on"as he put itand then escaped under a clear and dark sky, he
"startedsouth... then circledaroundnorth... and
headed for Baronette'sbridge on the Yellowstone,
Fisher's descriptionof the Nez Perces' escape
forty miles away."Shively guided himself by the
route- presumablythe onethatShivelyhadshowed "SodaButtes and the North Star,"which he could
them-is the most importantclue to the Indians' see from the
ridge. It is likely that Shivelyleft the
trackthroughthe Absarokas.On a topographical Nez Perces'
camp near present-dayLittle Saddle
map of YellowstoneNationalPark, Miller Creek Mountain,crossedthe LamarRivernearitsjunction
and the upper LamarRiverlook like good candi- with the
upper Lamar(where Reddingtonwould
dates for the Bannock's"trap";
both are long, deep
have seen his bootprint),andtraveledon the ridge
canyons,withfew or no exits. Butwhenyou look at west of the riverto Baronett'sbridge.32
the canyonson the ground,they arevery different.
Afterhe watchedthe Indiansflee intothe "trap,"
MillerCreekis a steep andthicklyforestedcanyon, Fisherreturnedto campandwaitedforhis scoutsto
matted with a tangle of fallen lodgepole pines, returnwith informationabout the location of the
sometimesthree logs deep. The upperLamaris a
fleeingIndians.The scoutshadexchangedfirewith
deep slash in the volcanicmountainside,with pre- the rearguardof the fleeingIndians-the shots that
cipitouscliffsand only two exits nearthe end of its
Fisherhadheardechoingin the canyonbelowhim.
canyon.Becauseoffrequentrun-offfloods,the river As Fisher recordedin his journal,his scouts told
has cut a wide swathas it dropsto the canyonfloor. him that the Nez Perces had tried to negotiate,
Pavedwith riverrock andfree of timber,the upper holleringto them:
Lamaropens like an invitingcauseway and then
we dont want to fight you for if you are Crows
quicklyturns into a narrowingfunnel as it climbs
Bannocksor Snakesyou are ourfriendslet us talk
towardthe Absarokasummit.This was the Nez
andSmoke.butthe boys knewtheirgame too well
Perces'shortestandmostdirectrouteto the Clark's
andtoldthem they wouldtalkwith theirguns the
Fork.Giventhe choice, it seems very unlikelythat
boys stoodthem offuntillafterdarklefttheirextra
for
the Nez Perceswouldhavepassedby this "trap"
animalsand slid out cautiously.33
the logjamjumbleof MillerCreek.29
This reportleft no doubtin Fisher'smind that the
There is other evidencethatthe upperLamaris
the "trap"and the principalroute the Nez Perces Nez Perces were movingeast to the Clark'sFork.
He spent September5 in campcleaningguns, writtook throughthe Absarokas.When recountinghis
reportsfor the command,and reflectingon his
scouting with Fisher, Reddington remembered ing
"Amtired,"Fisherwrotein his journal,"of
situation.
searchingfor Shively:
to
trying get Soldiers& hostiles together. U.S.too
No,we didnotsee Shively,butwesawhis bigtracks
slow for business."
inthe mudalongthe creekwherehe escaped.They
On September6, Fisherled his scouts downthe
lookedas thoughhe waswearinga no. 13boot.We
Lamarabout fifteen miles to Soda Butte Creek,
followedhis trail some distance, and yelled frewhere they followed the now fast-movingcomquentlyso that if he was hiding in the brush he
mand to the Clark'sFork. But on the way down
wouldcome out;but we got no response.30
the Lamar,the scoutsagainfound"theenemystrail"
Reddingtonhadbeen withFisheronlya few hours, at "apointwhere it [Lamar]formeda junctionwith
whentheywere"onthe headwatersofthe EastFork another Stream betwixt the Stream we followed
oftheYellowstone."
The onlystreamshe couldhave down and Soda Butte Creek. They [Nez Perces]
inspectedwere the upperLamar,Mist Creek,and then turnedSouthof Eastfollowingup this middle
ColdCreek.31
stream."34
30. Reddingtonto McWhorter,March 10, 1931, Folder 158, #93,
McWhorterPapers.
31. Reddingtonto McWhorter,November1931,Folder175, #167.
Whenhe wasaskedwhetherthe IndianswentupMillerCreek,Reddington replied:"Ineverheardof MillerKrick[MillerCreekwas namedin
1880],andknowthatthe hostile'smaintrailled up PelicanKrick,andon
to McWhorter,
thenorthwesttowardsthe headofEastFork."Reddington
correctedMcWhorter's
map,
February1935,Folder175,#99.Reddington
whichhad the Nez Percestravelingdirectlyacrossthe MirrorPlateau,
Folder175,#100,McWhorterPapers.

32. New Northwest,September14, 1877.LittleSaddleMountainis
high enough to providea clear view over the Absarokadivideto the
Clark'sFork of the Yellowstone,so it could be the peak from which
"Shivelyshowed them [Indians]the open countryabout 20 miles off
towardCrowcountry."
33. FisherJournal,p. 9.
34. Ibid.UsingFisher'smileageestimates,it is clearthathe wasnear
the mouthof the upperLamarRiverwhen he watchedthe Indianshead
east intothe "trap."
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This

description in Fisher'sjournalis

confusing.Howcouldhe watchthe Indians
dive into the "trap"and then discovertheir
The
trail again twelve miles down the Lamar?35
answer to the riddle begins with the assumption
thatthe Nez Percestraveledin onelargegroupand
that Joseph and LookingGlass campedtogether.
There is no reason for this assumptionand much
evidenceto the contrary.YellowWolftells us that
severalscoutingpartiescanvasedboth sides of the
YellowstoneRiverand thatthey operatedfromdifferent camps. And McWhorter'sinformantstold
him that Joseph was not lost but perhapsanother
grouphad become disoriented.36
We know that Shively was with Lean Elk and
LookingGlassandthatthe "SnakeChief'who had
been sent to scout for soldiershad been the one to
burn Baronett'sbridge. What we do not know is
whetherthe "SnakeChief'was withLookingGlass
or Joseph. It is likely that Joseph, who had later
insistedto Hugh Scottthathe had wantedto travel
downthe Yellowstone,had moveddownthe Lamar
to nearMilleror Calfeecreeks.This wouldhaveput
the two main Nez Perce camps abouteight to ten
milesapart,withthe livestocknearthe upperLamar,
the onlyplacealongthe LamarRiverwithsufficient
pasturefor such a largeherd.We also knowfroma
newspapercorrrespondentthat Howard'smilitary
scouts, who ascendedthe Lamarfrom Soda Butte
Creek after Fisher had caught up with Howard's
command,followedthe Indians'trailto
a washed-out
basin,wherethe constantactionof
towersandbattletheelementshasleftpinnacles,
mentsoftitanicstructure[where].... we couldin
halfadaybagthelot[NezPerces]ifwewerestrong
enough.Theynownumbernearly200lodges.37
The correspondentwas describing the Hoodoo
Basin at the head of the upper Lamar,a place of
exotic-lookingrockformationsand the logicalexit
from the "trap."The Hoodoo Basin is also easily
reachedby ascendingthe BannockTrailbetween
CacheandCalfeecreeksandtraversingsouthalong
theAbsarokadivide.SoJoseph'sandLookingGlass's
bands could easily have rendezvousedin the area
extendingfromParkerPeak to the HoodooBasin.
There are also largeparksin the area,which could
have providedthe livestockwith amplegrazing.
Fromthe HoodooBasinarea,the Nez Perceshad
severaleasy routesthey couldhave takento CrandallCreekandthe Clark'sForkRiver,whereFisher,
35. InFlightoftheNezPerce(338-339),BrownnotedFisher'sdiscovconjecturing
ery of the "enemystrail"butdid notfindthe contradiction,
that "itis highly probablethat the Indianscontinuedto followthe old
BannockTrail,"which went over the divide at Canoe Lake.Aubrey
alsomentionedFisher'sdouble
Haines,TheYellowstone
Story,1:235-236,
discovery,buthe putthe Indiansin bothinstanceson the BannockTrail,
eventhoughFisherhadtraveledtwelvemilesbetweensightings.

prospectorGeorge Huston, and two of Howard's
officersfoundthe Nez Perces'trailon September8.
From CrandallCreek, the Indianswent up Dead
Indian Hill, drew Colonel Samuel Sturgis out of
position, and droppeddown to the mouth of the
Clark'sFork Canyonand out towardthe Yellowstone River.That deception and the subsequent
fight at CanyonCreek against Sturgis'stroops is
anotherchapterin the storyof the flight.Fromthe
Nez Perces'exit fromYellowstoneNationalParkin
Septemberto the horrificbattleat SnakeCreekin
the Bears Paw Mountainsone month later, the
sequenceof forcedmarches,skirmishes,andbattle
rushed the Indiansheadlong into a tragichistory.
What remains importantin this story is the Nez
Perces'respitein the Park.
There is no proofthat the upperLamarwas the
primarycoursetakenbytheNezPerces,eventhough
the preponderanceof evidence, both in the documentary record and on the landscape, strongly
suggests this route.It is an interestingfinding,but
ifthatwereallthatwe couldlearnfromthe evidence
this wouldbe an only an engagingexercise.There
is somethingof more substancehere.
Whatthe evidence indicatesis that the Nez Perces were not lost in YellowstoneNationalPark.
Severalof the leaders,includingLookingGlassand
LeanElk,had been on the YellowstoneRivermany
timesbeforeandknewthe region.Whilethey made
their way throughthe Park-especially afterthey
had capturedthe tourists-the Indianskept scouts
busy searching for the best routes and on the
lookoutforthe militaryandmoretourists.Moreimportantly,the Nez Perces remainedset on avoiding
conflict,even thoughthey couldnot alwayscontrol
young warriorswho wantedto count coup or were
benton revengeforthe Big Holebattle.They set the
Carpentersfree anddidnotpursuemembersof the
Cowanpartywho had fled or Irwin after he had
escaped.Duringtheir trek throughthe Park,they
maintainedno rearguarduntilFisher'sscouts pursued them as they fled into the "trap."
The evidencealso indicatesthatthe Nez Perces
madetheirstrategicandtacticaldecisionsinacouncil
of leaders after discussing the alternatives.They
made these decisions as they went, facing each
situationandevaluatingthe inherentdangers.They
madesome seriousmistakes,bothbeforeandafter
Folder
36. McWhorter,YellowWolf,177;McWhorter
interrogations,
158,#124.
37. FrankJ. Parkerin IdahoWeekly
Statesman,September29, 1877.
Parkerreportedon the army'sprogressafterthey crossedthe partially
burnedbridge.ThedatelineforthissegmentwasSeptember9,1877,inthe
Yellowstonewilderness.
38. New Northwest,September14, 1877. Over the years, I have
profitedimmenselyfromdiscussionswith Stu Connerof Billings,Montana,aboutthe terrainnearthe Clark'sForkandthe Nez Perces'route
downto CanyonCreek.
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Atthe topof the Absarokadivide,wherethe twomainNez Percegroupsmayhavejoinedup,thereare
severalopen parkareaswhere the Indians'largeherd couldhave grazed.

theywereinYellowstone,butthereis littlequestion
that they succeeded in eluding the militaryand
thoroughlyfrustratingtheir pursuers.While they
werein the Park,they operatedwithlimitedknowledge of the military'spositions and strategy and
theymademistakes,buttheirerrorswerenotdueto
ignoranceabouttheirlocation,confusionaboutthe
landscape,orficklenessintheirgoal.The Nez Perces
wantedto stay in the Park. In other words, they
decidedto remainin the Park;they were not there
becauseof disorientationor incompetence.

ut this still does not answerthe larger

questions:why did the Nez Perces want to
stay in the Park, and why did they stay so
long?The few clues suggest some educatedspeculations.For one thing, the Nez Perces were tired
and needed to rest. They had been under steady
military pressure ever since they had entered
Montana,andYellowstoneofferedthem a measure
of relativesafety.They also expected aid and sanctuaryfrom the Crows,whose territorylay just beyond the mountainson the east edge of the Park.
Foranother,the Nez Perceswerehungry.Theyhad

kept movingafterthe Big Holebattleandhad done
little hunting. In Yellowstoneit was different,as
Lean Elk had told Shively:the Indiansplannedto
stayinthe Parkfora fewdays,becausethe "elkwere
abundantand they were living off the fat of the
land."38
Finally,they may have remainedbecause
the terrain and grasses looked disarminglylike
their homelandin Idahoand Oregon.
Regardlessof why they remainedin the Parkfor
thirteendays,it probablywas the crucialdifference
between a late summerescape to Canadaand the
cold and snowy Snake Creek seige that brought
theirsurrenderin earlyOctober.Throughouttheir
ordeal,the Nez Perces had pursuedthe same strategy: avoidanceof conflict with whites and attainmentof sanctuary.Whatthey wantedwas theirtrue
andjusthomelandandanendto harassment.Those
days in the Park may have been the closest they
came to their goals duringtheir heroic flight.o^_
WILLIAM
L. LANG,formereditorof Montana,has written manyarticleson the historyof Montanaandthe West
and is the co-authorof Montana:Our Landand People
(2nded., 1989).Langhas taughthumanhistorycourses,
including one on the Nez Perces in the Park, at the
YellowstoneInstitutesince 1981.He is currentlyworking
on a book aboutthe ColumbiaRiver.
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